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1. Introduction 
The recent U.S. policy initiatives contained in the so-called Jumpstart Our Business Startups 
(JOBS) Act allow companies planning a share listing to test the waters by gathering anchor 
investors’ expressions of interest in the company shares before filing for an IPO with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The main policy objectives of the JOBS Act are 
ensuring firms’ access to external finance with a view to encouraging real investment and job 
creation/preservation. Whether these policy objectives of the JOBS Act are likely to be 
achieved following a company’s IPO relies on whether and how long the company shares 
remain listed on a stock market. The longer a company’s stock remains listed on a stock 
market, the longer will the company have access to external capital. Anchor investors are 
commonly seen as facilitating the marketing of IPOs. We argue that they may also play a role 
in the post-IPO survival of share listings and examine the impact of anchor investors on the 
length of time stocks remain listed after an initial public offering (IPO). A recent study by 
Dambra, Field and Gustafson (2015) report that the introduction of the JOBS Act has had a 
positive impact on IPO volume. Our study adds to their findings on new listings by shedding 
light on the impact of anchor investors on how long such new listings remain listed. 
Our study contributes to the current debate over the role of anchor investors. Although stock 
markets in the U.S. and elsewhere are increasingly encouraging the involvement of anchor 
investors prior to IPOs, little is known about the impact of anchor investors on IPO 
performance. In fact, the involvement of anchor investors has resulted in controversy in some 
IPOs, most notably the Royal Mail IPO in the UK. The flipping of shares by Royal Mail’s 
cornerstone investors led to a policy review (Myners 2014) that highlighted the need for 
research on the issue. 
We consider two types of committed anchor investors: strategic investors and cornerstone 
investors. These investors have played a prominent role in the Hong Kong IPO market since 
they first appeared in the wake of the East Asian Crisis of 1997. Strategic investors are 
typically dedicated long-term investors who derive additional cash flows from their 
investment in the firm, or who add value to the issuing firm, e.g., through their reputation and 
capabilities (Fuerst and Geiger 2003). In many cases, they are corporate investors that operate 
in the same industrial sector as the issuing company. For example, the IPO of Chalco, the 
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leading Chinese aluminium producer, which gained a dual listing in New York and Hong 
Kong in December 2001, featured so-called strategic investors. Chalco’s main strategic 
investor Alcoa, the World’s largest aluminium producer, committed an investment just prior 
to the IPO that yielded Alcoa a 8% post-IPO stake in Chalco and agreed (and adhered) to a 
lock-up period of 30 months. The Chalco IPO prospectus outlines the plans for a joint venture 
between the two companies, and gives details of the appointment of an Alcoa executive as 
non-executive of Chalco.  
By contrast, cornerstone investors are typically high net-worth, financial investors, such as 
institutional investors and very wealthy individuals, who seek purely financial returns and 
have varying investment horizons. Cornerstone investors have featured in several recent 
initial public offerings (IPOs) including those of Glencore (a Swiss-based multinational 
conglomerate that gained a dual listing in Hong Kong and London), the UK Automobile 
Association (AA), the Dutch NN Group Insurance and the Royal Mail.  
Similar to U.S. anchor investors, these investors agree to invest in the IPO at the book 
building stage; but unlike in the U.S, these anchors investors enter into commitments both at 
the investment and post-IPO. Specifically, cornerstone and strategic investors enter into 
binding placing agreements with the issuing company and its advisors just prior to the release 
of the IPO prospectus whereby they agree to invest a specified monetary amount in the IPO. 
In return for this agreement, strategic and cornerstone investors are guaranteed to receive IPO 
shares for the full amount they pre-commit (even if the issue ends up being oversubscribed). 
Hong Kong listing rules require IPO firms and their underwriters to disclose full details 
relating to the allocation of shares to cornerstone and strategic investors. The guaranteed 
allocation of shares to these investors is also tied to post-IPO commitments as all cornerstone 
and strategic investors enter into lock-up agreements with IPO underwriters not to sell the 
shares they are allocated at the IPO during an agreed post-IPO lock-up period.  
In the U.S., by contrast, anchor investors express their interests in investing in the IPO shares 
but these expressions of interest are not legally binding. There is no requirement on 
companies in the U.S. to disclose either the names or investments of anchor investors at the 
time of the IPO. And U.S. anchor investors do not enter to lockup agreements committing not 
to sell the shares they buy for a specified period after the IPO.  
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Our analysis examines the impact of anchor-investor commitment on the length of time IPO 
stocks remain listed, and hence, the length of time the company continues to have access to 
external finance. Comparing the two types of committed anchor investors in Hong Kong, we 
find that strategic investors are significantly more committed than cornerstone investors both 
at the time of the IPO and particularly post-IPO. We find that longer post-IPO commitment, 
and greater involvement of strategic investors, including foreign investors, increases the 
length of time IPOs stock remain listed. Cornerstone investors, by contrast, appear to have 
little impact on IPO survival unless their post-IPO commitments are certified by a reputable 
underwriter.  
Our results suggest that anchors investors play a role not just in helping companies achieve a 
listing but also in maintaining that listing post-IPO. However, the achievement of the latter, 
which is closely linked to the policy objective of the JOBS Act of ensuring company’s access 
to finance over the longer-term, relies on the extent to which anchor investors are committed 
particularly post-IPO. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the impact of cornerstone and 
strategic investors on IPO survival performance. The absence of comparable research in most 
markets is due to the lack of data on anchor investor involvement in IPOs and on the 
allocation of shares in IPOs. The Hong Kong market is one of a handful of markets that 
require full disclosure of detailed information on overall investor demand for IPOs and the 
allocation of shares in the IPO to various investor groups, including retail, institutional, 
cornerstone and strategic investors.  
Our paper also contributes to the literature on IPO survival (e.g., Hensler et al. 1997, Jain and 
Kini 2000). The length of time a stock remains listed post-IPO matters to issuers. Issuers trade 
off the high costs of an IPO against the benefits of being listed. The benefits of a stock-market 
listing (including the ability to raise new funds in the primary market and trade existing shares 
in a liquid secondary market) are only available as long as an IPO remains listed on the stock 
market. The continued listing of an IPO is also of significance to outside investors who seek 
financial returns from liquid investments, and even to stock markets, whose reputations suffer 
when there are high numbers of delistings. Our paper is related to studies that examine the 
impact on IPO survival of pre-IPO investors (such as venture capital investors) and other 
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backers of the issuing firm providing pre-IPO certification (such as reputable underwriters or 
advisors). Our analysis shows that in addition to a direct effect of underwriter reputation on 
IPO survival, there is also an interaction effect suggesting that certification by reputable 
underwriters makes anchor-investor commitment more credible.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the 
institutional background of the Hong Kong Stock Market, and Section 3 outlines the existing 
literature and our research objectives. Section 4 describes the data and methodology. Our 
empirical findings are discussed in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Institutional Background  
This section describes the key regulatory features of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange that are 
relevant to IPO share allocation and the role of cornerstone and strategic investors. The IPO 
market of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) ranks highly internationally. It has proved 
to be resilient in terms of IPO volume while other IPO markets (including NASDAQ and 
NYSE) experienced sharp declines after the internet bubble (1999-2001) and following the 
Financial Crisis of 2008. Over the past decade, HKEx has consistently ranked amongst the 
world’s top five IPO markets in terms of funds raised by IPO firms, and during each of the 
three years following the 2008 Financial Crisis (2009-2011), HKEx ranked first. 
In terms of the allocation of shares to investors in an IPO, the HKEx combines clear rules 
with a significant degree of underwriter discretion. On the one hand, the allocation of shares 
to retail investors is subject to rules, including rules on the method of allocating shares to 
investors in oversubscribed IPOs.
1
 On the other hand, shares in the placing tranche are 
allocated to institutional, high-net-worth and corporate investors (both foreign and local) at 
the underwriter’s discretion. Up-front, guaranteed allocations to cornerstone and strategic 
investors constitute a significant part of the placing tranche (McGuinness 2014). 
                                                          
1
 Underwriters are required to allocate to retail investors 30% of the issue if demand in the subscription tranche 
is between 15-50 times the initial allocation, 40% of the issue when such demand is between 50-100 times the 
initial allocation, and 50% of the issue when demand is (over) 100 times the initial allocation. This standardized 
clawback provision does not apply to the additional shares that may be issued under the overallotment option 
(OAO) where underwriters retain full discretion over share allocation.  
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Unlike most markets, including the US and UK, the Hong Kong market requires full 
disclosure of information on the overall demand for IPO shares by investors, and on the 
allocation of shares in the IPO to various investor groups, including cornerstone and strategic 
investors as well as retail investors and institutions.  
Cornerstone and strategic investors first appeared in 1997 in the wake of the Asian Financial 
Crisis. Cornerstone investors include high-net-worth entities. Amongst them are some of the 
wealthiest individuals in Hong Kong, such as Li Ka-shing, chairperson of Hutchison 
Whampoa (who was ranked top of the Forbes Asia List with a total wealth of US $32 billion 
and Dr Lee Shau Kee, who leads Henderson Land and was ranked third with a wealth of 
about US 20 billion).
2
 Another group of cornerstone investors are state wealth funds (SWFs). 
For example, the Kuwait Investment Authority, the Qatar Investment Authority and Temasek 
(one of Singapore’s SWFs) subscribed to about 36.6 percent of the just over 25.4 billion 
shares offered by the Agricultural Bank of China Ltd when it was listed in July 2010. 
Cornerstone investors also include companies, some of which are controlled by investors 
from Mainland China.  
Strategic investors are major (corporate) customers and suppliers of the issuing company. 
They can also include companies operating in the same industry as the IPO firm. For 
example, BP Amoco Plc subscribed to 13.5 percent of the just over 16.78 billion shares 
offered by China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation when it was listed in October 2000. 
The German firm Siemens acquired about 5 percent of the shares offered by Shanghai Electric 
Company Ltd that was listed in April 2005. More recently, strategic investors have also 
included private equity providers and investment banks.  
Cornerstone and strategic investors enter into contractual placing agreements with the issuing 
company and its advisors, guaranteeing them a share allocation at the IPO amounting to a pre-
defined dollar amount. This is done just prior to the release of the prospectus and before the 
number of shares set aside for subscription to retail and institutional investors is finalized. The 
listing rules require IPO firms and their underwriters to disclose the full details relating to the 
allocation of shares to these privileged (cornerstone and strategic) investors. The guaranteed 
allocation of shares is often tied to commitments (lock-up agreements) made by the investor 
                                                          
2
 See the ranking at http://www.forbes.com/hong-kong-billionaires/list/. 
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to the IPO underwriters not to sell the allocated shares during an agreed lock-up period. Our 
analysis below shows that strategic investors normally commit to lock-up periods of between 
6 and 36 months, with an average of 12 months, while cornerstone investors are typically 
locked up for periods ranging from 6 to 12 months (with the average being 6 months). This is 
consistent with existing evidence on lockup periods reported in McGuinness (2012, 2014). 
McGuinness examines Hong Kong IPOs issued during 2005-2009, he finds a significant 
positive relation between cornerstone backing and IPO valuations. However, he finds no 
impact of strategic investors on IPO valuation or performance, most likely due to the small 
number of strategic-backed IPOs in his sample.  
3. Literature and Research Questions 
There is a substantial body of literature on the survival of newly listed stocks mostly focusing 
on North America. Their reported failure rates range widely due to differences between 
markets, sample periods, and stock characteristics (e.g., penny or high-tech stocks). E.g., U.S. 
estimates of five-year survival rates range from 9 to 47 percent. The seminal study by Hensler 
et al. (1997) investigates the relation between IPO survival rates and firm and issue 
characteristics using a hazard model and finds that survival rates are positively related to firm 
age and size, IPO initial returns and insider ownership. Jain and Kini (1999) examine the 
probability of surviving post-IPO and that firm size at the time of the IPO, pre-IPO operating 
performance and underwriter reputation are positively related to IPO survival. Jain and Kini 
(2000) examine whether venture capital (VC) involvement improves the survival profile of 
IPO firms. Their findings indicate that the probability of post IPO survival is significantly 
positively affected by VC backing and the prestige of the investment bank leading the 
underwriting syndicate as well as by other factors likely to benefit from VC involvement such 
as road show success and analyst following. Ahmed and Jelic (2014) report evidence for a 
positive relation between survival rates and lock-up periods in U.K. IPOs. 
We expect two possible effects of committed anchor investors on IPO survival: a selection 
effect and a treatment (or value-added) effect. The selection effect may arise from the superior 
abilities of informed investors to identify high-quality firms prior to their IPOs. Associated 
with this is the certification hypothesis (Megginson and Weiss 1991, Jain and Kini 2000), 
suggesting that reputable informed investors (such as pre-IPO venture capital backers) can 
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certify the quality of the issuing firm. Alternatively, or in addition, we expect a treatment (or 
value-added) effect due to the post-IPO monitoring and nurturing of the issuing company by 
its long-term investors that adds value, or rather “survivability”, to the company post-IPO.  
As cornerstone investors seek financial returns often in the short to medium term, we expect 
that they impact post-IPO performance through selection or certification. By contrast, 
strategic investors by definition aim to derive or add non-financial value from long-term 
investments in the issuing firm. Hence, we expect these investors to (mainly) impact post-IPO 
performance through nurturing such as post-IPO monitoring or sharing of expertise and 
networks. On the other hand, strategic investors may also have a selection effect: given their 
long-term strategic interests, they are likely to invest specifically in IPOs they expect to 
survive for longer. 
We model several dimensions of the impact of cornerstone and strategic investors. The first 
avenue of influence is through the size of the share allocation to each of these investor types 
in the IPO. Larger allocations may suggest a greater commitment by investors before the IPO 
and a greater influence on the issuing company post-IPO. Pre-IPO commitment and post-IPO 
alignment of interests is also captured by the length of the investors’ lock-up period. We 
expect strategic investors to have longer lock-up periods than the more short-term-oriented 
cornerstone investors. Also, we expect strategic investors’ lock-up periods to have a stronger 
impact on post-IPO performance. 
4. Data and Methodology 
We use a comprehensive sample of 903 IPOs issued on the Main Board of the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange during 1990-2010-Q2.3 The list of IPO firms, their listing dates and industry 
sectors are obtained from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange Annual Fact Book. IPO 
prospectuses and allocation data are from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Data on firm 
characteristics (including market capitalization, issue proceeds) are extracted from the 
prospectuses. In a few cases where data was initially missing, we use additional data from the 
Hong Kong regulator, the Securities and Futures Commission. Each IPO is tracked until 31 
December 2013 to determine whether it is delisted or not. Post-1999 delisting dates are 
                                                          
3 Our sample excludes introductions of stocks that were previously traded on another market.  
9 
 
collected from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange Annual Fact Book; pre-1999 delisting dates 
are hand-collected from the Hong Kong Public Library. We identify IPOs with cornerstone or 
strategic investors from the IPO prospectuses. Data relating to these investors is mostly from 
the prospectuses (investor names, numbers and lock-up agreements), the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (allocation details), and internet searches (on the investors; countries of origin). 
Offer price is obtained from the prospectus, and first-day closing stock prices from 
DataStream.  
Following existing literature (e.g., Espenlaub et al. 2012), we use survival analysis to 
investigate the determinants of the survival rates. In our study, IPOs are “right censored” if 
they have not yet been delisted and remain listed until the end of the study period (31 
December 2013). We define survivors as stocks of firms that continue to be traded on the 
HKEx. We distinguish between delisting due to M&A and delisting due to other, negative 
reasons, because the impact on investors is typically far more adverse in the case of negative 
delisting, e.g. liquidations, than in M&As. We examine the robustness of our results by 
alternately classifying all M&As as failures (non-survivors), or by treating all or some M&A 
stocks as “censored” survivors.  
We apply Kaplan-Meier method to estimate the survival rates for each post-IPO month for the 
full sample and for various subsamples. To test whether IPOs in different groups, backed by 
strategic investors, cornerstone investors or un-backed IPOs, share the same Kaplan-Meier 
survival curves, we use the log rank test (e.g., Kleinbaum and Klein 1996, pp557-63), a large-
sample chi-square test. We estimate the Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model and Cox 
proportional hazard model. Prior studies (Hensler et al. 1997, Jain and Kini 2000, Espenlaub 
et al. 2012) use the AFT method that allows the impact of the independent variables on the 
survival time to vary over the post-IPO period, depending on the length of time since listing. 
The AFT model is typically expressed in terms of a log-linear function with respect to time 
(see e.g. Hensler et al. 1997; Bradburn et al. 2003): 
 jp110j ...)Ln(T   pXX  (1) 
Specifically, we estimate the following model: 
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where Ln(Tj) is the natural logarithm of the survival time or time to failure, and the 
independent variables are as follows: Strategic (and similarly Cornerstone) is measured as (i) 
a binary variable, (ii) the average lock-up period of these investors in the IPO, (iii) the number 
of these investors involved in the IPO, (iv) the ratio of foreign to local strategic (or 
cornerstone) investors and (v) the proportion of shares in the IPO allocated to these investor. 
Demand multiple is the oversubscription rate for shares at the time of the IPO; Insider 
ownership is the percentage of insider ownership at the time of the IPO; Family control is a 
dummy variable taking a value of one if the IPO firm is family controlled and zero otherwise; 
Instit. Allocation is the proportion of shares in the IPO allocated to institutional investors; Age 
is the number of years from establishment until the IPO; Size is market capitalization at the 
IPO price; Initial return is the difference between the first-day closing and offer price as a 
percentage of the offer price; Proceeds is IPO proceeds in million Hong Kong dollars. Pre-
IPO net profits is the operating income in the year before the year of the IPO; Pre-IPO sales 
is sales before the year of the IPO; H-share is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the IPO firm 
is incorporated in mainland China but listed in Hong Kong and zero otherwise; Reputable 
underwriter is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an IPO is underwritten by reputable 
underwriters as measured by the number of IPOs and proceeds, and zero otherwise.
4
 We 
control for industry and year fixed effects.
5
 
As the AFT is a parametric model, it is necessary to specify the distribution of the baseline 
survival function. We use the likelihood ratio or Wald tests to determine the appropriate 
distribution in the case of nested models, such as comparing the Weibull against the 
exponential distribution, or the gamma against the Weibull or lognormal distribution. The 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is the appropriate test for choosing the best-fitting model 
in the case of non-nested models, such as between the log-logistic and the lognormal 
distributions. The AIC is defined as  
                                                          
4
 See definitions of variables in Appendix I. 
5
 There is no evidence of multicollinearity; see Appendix V for the correlation matrix. 
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 )(22 ckLLnAIC   (3) 
where L is the maximized value of the likelihood function, k is the number of model 
covariates and c is the number of model-specific distributional parameters. Both the 
lognormal and log-logistic models have two distributional parameters (c = 2). The AIC test 
shows that the lognormal distribution has a lower AIC value than the log-logistic model, and 
hence we select the lognormal distribution.  
In the AFT model, the exponential of the coefficient is an ‘acceleration factor’ also known as 
the time ratio: The effect of an independent variable (covariate) is to extend or shrink the 
length of survival by a constant relative amount equal to the time ratio. If the time ratio is 
greater than one, an increase in the covariate increases survival time; while with a time ratio 
below one, an increase in the covariate decreases survival time (Bradburn et al. 2003). By 
comparison, in the Cox Model, the acceleration factor is the hazard ratio. If the hazard ratio is 
above one, then an increase in the covariate increases the failure rate (note here the dependent 
variable is failure risk, not the survival time), while a hazard ratio of less than one suggests 
that an increase in the covariate decreases the failure rate. 
5. Results 
Table I shows the distribution of IPOs, and of surviving and delisted stocks, in our sample of 
903 Hong Kong IPOs listed between 1990 and 2010 (Q2). The numbers of IPOs per year are 
broadly stable over this period, unlike in US IPO markets. By the end of 2013, 107 of our 
sample IPOs are delisted due to a merger or acquisition (M&A) and 73 IPOs are delisted for 
other reasons (including suspension and withdrawal). By IPO year, the percentage of delisted 
IPOs ranges from 4 percent (for the most recent IPOs) to 35 percent (for some of the earliest 
IPO cohorts). There is some difference in terms of M&A and other delistings, with the latter 
becoming more frequent over recent years. As outlined above, we allow for alternate ways of 
classifying M&A delistings (as either failures or censored non-survivors). 
[TABLE I HERE] 
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In Table II, we first examine the prevalence of backing of IPOs by either cornerstone or 
strategic investors.
6
 We observe a substantial presence of strategic and cornerstone investors 
with 202 IPOs backed by strategic investors and 179 IPOs backed by cornerstone investors. 
These figures amount to 33 and 30 percent, respectively, of the 607 Hong Kong IPOs issued 
during 1997-2010. In our analysis, we measure the strength of the post-IPO commitment of 
cornerstone and strategic investors by the length of their lockup periods. We find that 
strategic investors are on average locked up for 12 months with a maximum of 36 months. 
For example, the lockup period of strategic investor Alcoa in the Chalco IPO (described in the 
Introduction) is 30 months, close to the maximum. By contrast, cornerstone investors are on 
average locked up for just 6 months with a maximum of 12 months. The differences in mean 
and median lockup periods between cornerstone and strategic investors are both economically 
and statistically significant. We conclude that strategic investors are significantly more 
committed post-IPO than cornerstone investors.  
An indicator of investor commitment at the time of the IPO is the proportion of the share 
issue taken up by the two investor types with a larger allocation suggesting greater 
commitment. On average, strategic investors take up 28 percent of a given IPO. This 
aggregate allocation is shared among an average of 4 strategic investors per issue. The 
cornerstone investors of a given IPO on average take up 20 percent of the shares on offer at 
the IPO, and this aggregate cornerstone take-up is shared among an average of 3 cornerstone 
investors per issue. The difference between strategic and cornerstone investors in terms of 
their mean aggregate IPO allocations is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. This 
leads us to conclude that strategic investors are more committed than cornerstone investors at 
the IPO.  
Finally, we examine the influence of foreign investors among the two investor types. As 
reported above, there is an average number of 4 strategic and 3 cornerstone investors per IPO, 
and of these we find that about 1 in 3 investors is foreign while the remaining 2 are locally-
based investors. The difference between strategic and cornerstone investors in terms of the 
ratio of foreign-to-local investors is minor, although the difference in medians is statistically 
                                                          
6
 The figures reported in Table I (and the subsequent estimations) exclude 13 IPOs that received backing by both 
cornerstone and strategic investors. This subsample is too small to yield meaningful insights when analyzed 
separately. 
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significant at 10 percent. In conclusion, there is some evidence that foreign investors play a 
slightly greater role among strategic investors than among cornerstone investors. 
Next, we examine underwriter reputation. There is some evidence that reputable underwriter 
are associated with less risky IPOs (Carter and Manaster 1990). Following Carter and 
Manaster, underwriter reputation is typically measured using tombstone rankings in U.S. 
studies. As no comparable tombstones are available in Hong Kong, we measure reputation by 
market share: reputable underwriters are those in the top quartile in terms of both numbers 
and proceeds of IPOs they bring to the market during the three years prior to the IPO year. 
We find that reputable underwriters are involved in one quarter of strategic-backed IPOs but 
in only 11 percent of cornerstone-backed IPOs. Certification of IPOs by reputable 
underwriters may be more important to strategic investors due to their longer investment 
horizons. By contrast, cornerstone investors appear to rely less on underwriter certification. In 
fact, cornerstone-backed IPOs appear to be associated with less reputable underwriters. In 
conclusion, we find that strategic investors’ commitment, particularly their post-IPO 
commitment through lockup agreements with underwriters, is more commonly certified by 
reputable underwriters than cornerstone investors’ commitments. Certification by reputable 
underwriters is likely to render these investors’ commitments more credible and effective. We 
examine this conjecture further below. 
Next, we compare and contrast other characteristics of IPOs backed by strategic investors 
with those backed by cornerstone investors. Focusing on statistically significant differences 
between the two subsamples, we find that strategic-backed IPOs are less oversubscribed than 
cornerstone-backed IPOs and have lower initial returns. The allocation of IPO shares to 
institutional investors (excluding cornerstone or strategic investors) is somewhat lower in 
strategic-backed IPOs (52 percent) than in cornerstone-backed IPO (60 percent), but this 
difference is not statistically significant.  
Comparing the characteristics of issuing companies, we find that strategic-backed IPOs are 
issued by smaller yet older companies. Cornerstone-backed IPOs have significantly larger 
market capitalization and higher proceeds than strategic-backed IPOs but pre-IPO sales and 
pre-IPO net profits are not significantly different between the two subsamples. Strategic-
backed IPO companies are on average 20 years old at the time of going public, while the age 
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of cornerstone-backed companies is (statistically) significantly lower at just 16 years. Just 
under half of strategic-backed IPOs are issued by family firms, while there are no family 
firms at all in the cornerstone-backed subsample of IPOs. This suggests that family-owned 
IPO firms prefer strategic investors that enter into long-term commitments to cornerstone 
investors with short-term investment horizons. Strategic-backed IPOs are less likely to be 
Mainland Chinese companies issuing H shares.  
[TABLE II HERE] 
Breaking down the strategic and cornerstone-backed subsamples into stocks that survive and 
those that fail by the end of 2013, we find that only 12 IPOs (6 percent) of the 202 strategic-
backed IPOs fail, compared to 28 (15.6 percent) of the 179 cornerstone-backed IPOs, and 46 
(20.4 percent) of the 226 unbacked IPOs. These figures clearly suggest an association 
between committed anchor-investor backing and IPO survival. To examine the impact of the 
committed investor types on survival more rigorously, we compute the non-parametric 
Kaplan-Meier survival rates of strategic- and cornerstone-backed IPOs relative to IPOs 
without such backing. Table III shows cumulative Kaplan-Meier survival rates by the end of 
the first, third and fifth post-IPO year for IPOs listed during 1997-2010(Q2). Using log rank 
tests, we conclude that the Kaplan-Meier survival rates of strategic-backed IPOs are 
statistically significantly higher than those of cornerstone-backed IPOs and of unbacked IPOs 
(at significance levels above 5 percent). 
Examining survival rates for each of the 14 IPO year cohorts (or vintages), we find that 
almost all cohorts of strategic-backed IPOs have 100 percent survival rates over the first post-
IPO year. The exception is the 2001 vintage with a survival rate of 95 percent. Over the 
medium term (three years post-IPO), we find 100 percent survival of strategic-backed IPOs 
for eight of the 14 IPO year cohorts, with the lowest survival rate of 92 percent observed for 
the 2001 cohort. After five years post-IPO, we still find 100 percent survival for four of the 12 
cohorts of strategic-backed IPOs. Note, we observe five post-IPO years only for 12 IPO year 
cohorts (compared to 14 cohorts for which we can observe survival over one and three post-
IPO years) because there are fewer than five years between the final IPO year and the end of 
our study period (end 2013) The lowest five-year survival rate for strategic-backed IPOs is 89 
15 
 
percent (corresponding to a delisting or failure rate of 11 percent) observed for the 2008 
cohort.  
Cornerstone-backed IPOs have equally high survival rates over the first post-IPO year. Even 
IPOs without the backing of committed (strategic or cornerstone) investors have relatively 
high one-year survival rates (for most year cohorts except in 1998 and 2000). However, 
differences emerge and widen over subsequent years of listing. Three-year survival rates are 
higher for strategic-backed IPOs than cornerstone-backed IPOs. Eight (four) of the 14 year 
cohorts of IPOs backed by strategic (cornerstone) investors have 100 percent survival after 
three years. Of the remaining six year cohorts (where strategic-backed IPOs have less than 
100 percent survival), strategic backed IPOs have higher survival rates than cornerstone-
backed IPOs in four of these six cohorts. Compared to unbacked IPOs, strategic-backed IPOs 
have higher (or the same) three-year survival rates in each year cohort. The difference 
becomes even clearer when we focus on five year survival rates. We find that IPOs backed by 
strategic investors have higher survival rates than either cornerstone-backed IPOs or 
unbacked IPOs in each of the year cohorts. Overall, we find that the positive impact of 
strategic investors (and to a lesser extent, of cornerstone investors) on survival grows stronger 
the longer we track companies post-IPO. 
[TABLE III HERE] 
Our univariate analysis so far suggests an association between the involvement of strategic 
and cornerstone investors in IPOs and post-IPO survival. Next, we conduct a multivariate 
analysis to examine the impact of strategic and cornerstone investors on IPO survival after 
controlling for a range of company and IPO characteristics and other known determinants of 
IPO survival. First, we estimate an AFT model that controls for company and issue 
characteristics including the age of the IPO firm, size as measured by market capitalization, 
pre-IPO net profits, pre-IPO sales, insider ownership, IPO initial returns, proceeds, 
institutional share allocation, and the level of oversubscription of the IPO (known as the 
demand multiple). In this AFT model we treat observations that are delisted due to an M&A 
as censored survivors. As the baseline distribution of the model, we choose the log-normal 
distribution based on the AIC (as outlined in the methodology section above).  
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In Model I, we measure strategic and cornerstone backing using a binary indicator and find 
that backing by strategic investors significantly increases the time to delisting. The impact of 
strategic investors is both economically and statistically significant. The exponential of the 
statistically significant positive strategic-investor coefficient (0.382) is the time ratio (1.466). 
This time ratio suggests that the presence of a strategic investor increases survival times by 
46.6 percent (i.e., a one-unit increase in the strategic-investor variable increases survival times 
by a multiple of 1.466). IPO backing by cornerstone investors, by contrast, plays no 
significant role (given its statistically insignificant coefficient). We also find that share 
allocations to institutional investors are statistically significant, but only at 10 percent 
conventional level. This raises the question of why up-front involvement by strategic 
investors has a significant impact on IPO survival, while cornerstone backing and allocations 
to institutional investors pursuant to the wider IPO allocation do not.  
To address this question we need to understand the underlying factors that drive the impact of 
strategic investors on IPO survival. One important aspect is likely to be the lock-up 
agreements entered into by strategic and cornerstone investors. We estimate a series of 
survival models that (instead of binary indicators) use four continuous measures of the 
involvement, and commitment, of strategic and cornerstone investors. First, in Model II, we 
examine the impact of lock-up agreements. In principle, investors with (longer) lock-up 
agreements will have a greater incentive to ensure a company stays listed at least until the end 
of the lock-up period. Thus, we expect that strategic investors (with an average 12-month 
lock-up period) will be associated with longer survival times than cornerstone investors (with 
an average 6-month lock-up period). Compared to strategic and cornerstone investors, we 
expect a weaker or no effect on IPO survival of institutional investors that are allocated shares 
in the IPO without a lock-up period.  
Next, in Model III, we measure investor impact using the number of investors of either type 
backing a given IPO. We expect that more investors of a given type will increase their impact 
on the IPO firm, including on the firm’s propensity to delist. Model IV examines the role of 
foreign investors (as opposed to local investors) of either type. Foreign investors may have 
less influence due to their remoteness from the market (and from the firm in the case of Hong 
Kong based companies). They may also derive different levels of benefits from the company 
remaining listed (and possibly bear a different share of the costs of listing). Foreign investors’ 
17 
 
incentives to ensure the firm remains listed may therefore differ from those of domestic 
investors. Finally, in Model V, we examine the proportions of shares issued in the IPO that 
are allocated to strategic or cornerstone investors. Taking up a larger share of the issue may 
signify greater investor commitment at the IPO, and hence impact IPO survival. 
The results of Model II, shown in Table IV, show that the length of strategic investors’ lock-
up periods significantly increases the time to delisting. This is consistent with our expectation 
that greater investor commitment post-IPO through longer lockup periods leads to longer 
survival times. By contrast, the lock-up periods of the less committed cornerstone investors 
do not significantly impact survival times. 
In Model III, we find that larger numbers of strategic investors have a statistically significant, 
positive impact on survival times: More strategic investors in an IPO result in the stock 
remaining listed longer. By contrast, the effect of cornerstone investors is insignificant, that 
is, the number of cornerstone investors backing an issue does not matter to IPO survival. 
Focusing on the ratio of foreign to local investors in Model III, we find that the presence of 
more foreign strategic investors does in fact significantly delay delisting. Rather than being 
more remote and less committed, this result suggests greater commitment, or greater 
credibility of commitment, by foreign as compared to local investors. For cornerstone 
investors, by contrast, the impact of the ratio of foreign to local investors on survival times is 
statistically insignificant. 
Model V shows that the proportions of shares allocated to strategic or cornerstone investors at 
IPOs have no statistically significant impact on survival times. We also examine the impact of 
the dollar amounts invested by strategic and cornerstone investors in a given IPO, and find 
qualitatively similar, insignificant results (not reported). This suggests that it is not the 
amount invested nor the percentage stake taken up by strategic investors, but purely their 
contractual commitments at and after the IPO, that drive their impact on IPO survival. 
Finally, we examine whether anchor investors’ commitments are more credible if these 
commitments are certified by reputable underwriters. Specifically, anchor investors’ post-IPO 
commitments revolve around the lockup agreements they entered into with IPO underwriters. 
Post-IPO, underwriters may allow locked up investors to sell shares prior to the end of their 
lockup periods. In the U.S., such early release from lockup periods is becoming increasingly 
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common in IPOs and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Hence, we expect that anchor 
investors’ lockup agreements are more credible if they are entered into with underwriters that 
have more reputation capital at stake. 
Models VI and VII in Table IV include interaction terms between anchor-investor variables 
and underwriter reputation to test whether underwriter reputation increases the committed 
anchor-investor effect on IPO survival times. In this case, we expect a positive coefficient on 
the interaction term. Consistent with this expectation, in Model VI, we find statistically 
significant, positive coefficients of the binary indicators of both strategic- and cornerstone-
investor backing. In fact, we find that the direct effect of strategic-investor backing is 28.2 
percent increase of survival time (given the time ratio of 1.282), while the indirect interaction 
effect of strategic-investor backing with reputable underwriter certification is 1.5 times the 
direct effect. IPOs backed by strategic investors whose commitment is certified by reputable 
underwriters have 42 percent longer survival times than strategic-backed IPOs without 
underwriter certification. The direct effect of cornerstone investors remains insignificant as in 
the previous analyses, but cornerstone-backing that is certified by reputable underwriters 
(who are involved in just 11 percent of cornerstone-backed IPOs as shown in Table II above) 
does significantly increase survival times by 10 percent (time ratio 1.099). 
Focusing on underwriter certification of anchor investors’ lockup agreements in Model VII, 
we find statistically significant positive coefficients on the interaction terms of underwriter 
reputation and lockup length for both strategic and cornerstone investors. We conclude that 
underwriter certification renders investor commitments more credible for both strategic 
investors and their relatively less committed counterparts, cornerstone investors. Our results 
suggest that the positive effect on IPO survival of strategic investors’ post-IPO commitment is 
increased by reputable underwriter certification. However, as shown by the positive direct 
effect (the significant positive coefficient) of strategic-investor lockup periods, strategic 
investors’ post-IPO commitment is credible even without underwriter certification. By 
contrast, cornerstone investors’ post-IPO commitment is only credible if it is certified by 
reputable underwriters.
7
  
                                                          
7
 Our results remain quantitatively the same when we use a sample of IPOs listed between 1997 and 2010. Please 
see the results in Appendix IV. 
19 
 
[TABLE IV HERE] 
Robustness of the results 
We examine the robustness of our results in several ways. First, we treat delistings due to 
M&As as censored survivors rather than as “failures” (as in Table IV above). This means that 
our analysis focuses on explaining delistings due to reasons that are more clearly 
unfavourable to investors (suspensions, withdrawals and other delistings) than M&As, which 
may not be detrimental to (target) shareholders. See the discussion of whether M&As should 
be treated as failures or censored survivors in Espenlaub et al. (2012). The results shown in 
Table V, corresponding to Table IV, are qualitatively unchanged. We find that strategic 
investors have a significant positive impact on survival times (at the 1 percent level of 
significance) irrespective of whether their influence is measured as a binary indicator, the 
number of such investors, the ratio of foreign to local strategic investors, or the lock-up 
periods of strategic investors.  
[TABLE V HERE] 
As a further robustness check and for comparison with other studies, we also estimate the Cox 
proportional hazard model, applied, for example, by Carpentier and Suret (2011). Unlike the 
AFT model, the Cox model makes no assumption about the distribution of the baseline 
parameter. The dependent variable in the Cox model measures the risk of delisting (failure) as 
opposed to the survival time that is measured in the AFT model. In the Cox model, the 
marginal effect of an independent variable is measured by the so-called hazard ratio, 
calculated as the exponential of the coefficient from the Cox model (see, e.g., and Klein 
1996). A positive coefficient implies a hazard ratio greater than one, suggesting that an 
increase in the covariate increases the failure rate. Similarly, a negative coefficient implies a 
hazard ratio of less than one, indicating that an increase in the covariate reduces the failure 
rate. The corresponding measure of the marginal effect in the AFT model is the so-called 
“time ratio”. The time ratio is calculated as the exponential of the AFT coefficient (Bradburn 
et al. 2003). As a consequence, we expect that a given independent variable with a positive 
sign (and a time ratio above one) in the AFT model will have a negative coefficient (and a 
hazard ratio of less than one) in the Cox model. Bearing in mind this difference in the signs of 
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the coefficients, the results reported in Table VI are qualitatively the same as those reported 
for the AFT models in Tables IV and V above.  
[TABLE VI HERE] 
In Table VII, we control for endogeneity and selection effects. Our results for strategic 
investors above may be due to strategic investors’ selection of companies that are likely to 
survive longer, or due to omitted variables determining both strategic investor backing and 
survival. To disentangle selection and treatment effects, we use a propensity score model to 
match IPOs backed by cornerstone or strategic investors with non-backed IPOs, by age, initial 
returns, market capitalization, proceeds, pre-IPO sales and pre-IPO profit. Panel A shows the 
mean and median values for cornerstone-investor-backed IPOs and a non-backed matched 
sample excluding IPOs backed by strategic investors. Panel B shows the results of strategic-
investor-backed IPOs and a matched sample of non-cornerstone-backed companies. In Panels 
A and B the characteristics of the matched samples in terms of means and medians are not 
statistically different from the IPOs backed by either cornerstone or strategic investors.  
Panel C of Table VII shows the AFT results, where M&As are treated as failures (Model I) 
and censored (Model II). The results of Model I in Table VII are comparable to those of 
Model I in Table IV. The strategic-investor indicator is positive and statistically significant, 
while the indicator of cornerstone backing is statistically insignificant. These results suggest 
that backing by strategic investors has a positive treatment effect on the survival of IPOs. In 
other words, our results suggest that strategic investors ‘add survivability’ to IPO firms 
through their post-IPO commitment to monitoring and sharing of expertise and networks, etc. 
In Model II of Table VII, we alternately treat M&As as censored survivors; and find results 
that are consistent with Model I in that the presence of strategic investors adds survivability to 
IPO firms. The impacts of other (control) variables are similar to the results reported in Tables 
IV and V, respectively. It is possible that strategic or cornerstone investors do not select their 
IPOs companies randomly. This may induce a sample selection bias. To address this concern 
we estimate the inverse mills ratios and include these as additional control variables in the 
AFT model. Model III, show the results controlling for such possible sample selection bias. It 
is evident that sample selection is not a concern in our estimates, since both inverse mills 
ratios (strategic/cornerstone) are not significant at any conventional level. Our results that 
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IPOs with strategic investors have higher survival times than those backed by cornerstone 
remain robust.  
Overall, the results suggest that the presence and commitment of strategic investors has a 
positive impact on the survival of IPOs post listing, while the presence of less committed 
cornerstone investors does not. 
[TABLE VII HERE]  
6. Conclusion 
This study examines the impact of anchor investors’ commitment on IPO survival, focusing 
on two types of committed anchor investors: strategic and cornerstone investors. The Hong 
Kong IPO market provides detailed data on IPO share allocations and on the placing 
agreements between issuers and anchor (strategic/cornerstone) investors that are not available 
in most other markets. Based on a comprehensive sample of Hong Kong IPOs between 1990 
and 2010, we find that strategic and cornerstone investors participate in a significant number 
of IPOs (about 33 and 30 percent, respectively). We find that, compared to cornerstone 
investors, strategic investors make stronger commitments at the IPO and particularly post-
IPO. The lock-up periods of strategic investors are significantly longer (on average 12 
months) than those of cornerstone investors (averaging 6 months). Strategic investors’ 
commitments (through their lockup agreements) are more likely to be certified by reputable 
underwriters than those of cornerstone investors. We find that the backing of the IPO by more 
committed anchor investors (strategic investors) significantly increases how long IPO stocks 
remain listed. Specifically, we estimate that strategic-investor backing increases listing (or 
survival) times by between 39 to 75 percent. The level of strategic investors’ post-IPO 
commitment, as reflected in the length of their lockup periods, significantly increases the 
length of time the IPO remains listed. The numbers of strategic investors backing an IPO, and 
the proportion of foreign relative to local strategic investors, also significantly increase how 
long IPOs remain listed. The impact of strategic-investor backing is even stronger when their 
(post-IPO) commitments are certified by reputable underwriters. The less committed anchor 
investors (cornerstone investors), by contrast, have no significant direct impact on IPO 
survival times. It is only if cornerstone investors’ commitments are certified by reputable 
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underwriters that they have a (comparatively small) significant impact on survival times. 
Controlling for selection effects, we find that our results are driven by treatment effects, that 
is, by the value that strategic investors add to IPO companies by strategic investors through 
their monitoring, expertise and access to networks.  
In sum, our results indicate that the presence of committed anchor investors at and after the 
IPO, and the strength of their commitment are significant determinants of IPO survival. Our 
results are important for issuers, investors and practitioners, and to stock markets and policy 
makers promoting the involvement of anchor investors. The success of policy initiatives such 
as the U.S. JOBS Act, that promote anchor investors to facilitate IPOs, may achieve their aim 
of ensuring companies’ longer-term access to external finance by ensuring or increasing 
anchor investors’ commitment. 
Our paper highlights not only the significance of anchor investors’ commitment, but also the 
need for disclosure of anchor investors’ involvement in IPOs. Our results show that 
knowledge of anchor-investor involvement, along with data on IPO share allocation, allows 
investors to identify IPOs that are more likely to remain listed for longer. This finding raises 
serious concerns over the lack of disclosure of allocation data in most IPO markets.  
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Table I: Distribution of IPO firms by year of listing 
This table shows the distribution of IPO firms listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange between 1990 and the 
end of June 2010. The sample is divided into failures due to M&As and due to other reasons for delisting up to 
the end of December 2013. 
IPO 
Year 
Full sample M&A M&A  Other Other 
  Delistings Delisting (%) Delistings Delisting (%)  
1990 13 4 30.77 0 0.00 
1991 48 12 25.00 2 4.17 
1992 54 13 24.07 5 9.26 
1993 63 15 23.81 7 11.11 
1994 50 10 20.00 7 14.00 
1995 24 4 16.67 3 12.50 
1996 44 7 15.91 5 11.36 
1997 78 8 10.26 3 3.85 
1998 28 3 10.71 2 7.14 
1999 28 3 10.71 2 7.14 
2000 37 6 16.22 1 2.70 
2001 30 3 10.00 3 10.00 
2002 48 8 16.67 5 10.42 
2003 37 2 5.41 2 5.41 
2004 31 2 6.45 1 3.23 
2005 52 1 1.92 1 1.92 
2006 52 1 1.92 2 3.85 
2007 77 2 2.60 9 11.69 
2008 27 2 7.41 4 14.81 
2009 58 1 1.72 8 13.79 
2010 (Q2) 24 0 0.00 1 4.17 
Total 903 107 12% 73 8% 
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Table II: Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
The table shows descriptive statistics for the two subsamples of IPOs backed by either cornerstone or strategic investors. The presence of cornerstone investors (and similarly 
of strategic investors) is measured as (i) the proportion of shares in the IPO allocated to these investors, (ii) the number of these investors involved in the IPO, (iii) the ratio of 
foreign to local cornerstone (or strategic) investors, and (iv) the average lock-up period of these investors in the IPO. Instit. Allocation is the proportion of shares in the IPO 
allocated to institutional shareholders. Demand multiple is the oversubscription rate for shares at the time of the IPO. Insider ownership is the percentage of insider ownership 
at the time of the IPO. Family control is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the IPO firm is family controlled and zero otherwise. Age is the number of years from 
establishment until the IPO. Initial return is the difference between the first-day closing and offer price as a percentage of the offer price. Size is market capitalization at the 
IPO price (in million Hong Kong dollars). Proceeds is IPO proceeds in million Hong Kong dollars. Pre-IPO sales is sales before the year of the IPO. Pre-IPO net profits is 
the operating income in the year before the year of the IPO. H-share is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the IPO firm is incorporated in the Chinese mainland but listed in 
Hong Kong and zero otherwise. Reputable underwriter is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an IPO is underwritten by reputable underwriters as measured by the 
number of IPOs and proceeds, and zero otherwise.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
 
 Mean Median STD Min Max 
 Corner Strat. Corner Strat. Corner Strat. Corner Strat. Corner Strat. 
Corner/Strat_investors’ lock-up (months) 6.00*** 12.00 6.00*** 12.00 3.40 5.70 6.00 6.00 12.00 36.00 
Corner/Strategic investors’ IPO alloacation 0.202* 0.284 0.190 0.200 0.116 0.145 0.031 0.038 0.625 0.764 
Number of Corner/Strat_investors per IPO 3.00 4.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 1.00 1.00 9.00 11.00 
Corner/Strat_investors (foreign to local) 0.628 0.592 0.529* 0.573 0.403 0.401 0.000 0.00 1.714 1.571 
Instit. Allocation 0.60 0.52 0.55 0.48 0.25 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.80 
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Table II continued 
 
 
Demand multiple 127.02** 67.46 35.20** 18.70 110.20 58.53 6.00 3.19 441.68 234.59 
Insider ownership 0.71 0.77 0.75 0.70 0.05 0.05 0.65 0.61 0.87 0.81 
Family control 0.00*** 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Age 15.90* 20.10 12.65* 16.00 11.70 14.80 5.54 7.00 45.87 58.00 
Initial return 0.180* 0.100 0.11* 0.06 0.24 0.14 -0.19 -0.11 0.75 0.43 
Size (m) 6220.00** 4789.40 4150.00** 3730.00 9240.00 9040.80 204.00 184.08 26100.00 20097.00 
Proceeds (m) 2140.00* 1968.80 1180.00* 1085.60 2250.00 2070.00 51.00 59.40 6520.00 5998.40 
Pre-IPO sales (m)  5056.00 4940.29 4328.00 4228.95 3081.00 3010.49 97.00 94.78 9238.00 9026.58 
Pre-IPO net profits 393.00 388.61 248.00 245.23 36.00 35.60 20.00 19.78 1086.00 1073.88 
H-shares 0.18* 0.120 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Reputable underwriter 0.109** 0.245 0.00 0.00 0.191 0.254 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
No of obs 179 202         
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Table III: Survival rates 
This table shows the survival rates for all IPOs listed between 1997 and 2010, by IPO year and by type of 
investor backing the IPO (i.e., cornerstone- and strategic-investor backed IPOs, and unbacked IPOs). Each IPO 
firm is tracked over one year, three years and five years post listing. For firms listed in 2009 and 2010, only one-
year and three-year survival rates are reported. 
    
  
Strategic  
investors 
 
  Cornerstone investors 
  
Unbacked IPOs 
 
IPO 
year 
 Cum. survival rate 
 
 Cum. survival rate 
  
Cum. survival rate 
 
Obs 
1 
Yr 
3 
Yrs 
5 
Yrs 
 
Obs 
 
1 
Yr 
3 
Yrs 
5 
Yrs 
 
Obs 
 
1 
Yr 
3 
Yrs 
5 
Yrs  
1997 9 100 100 100 
 
6 100 100 100 
 
63 100 96 91  
1998 8 100 100 100  7 100 100 100  13 96 88 86  
1999 11 100 100 100  9 100 98 95  8 100 96 92  
2000 13 100 100 100  10 100 96 92  14 97 93 90  
2001 17 95 92 90  13 96 94 89  0 N/A N/A N/A  
2002 12 100 99 97  8 100 95 91  28 100 95 92  
2003 8 100 100 98  9 100 98 96  20 100 96 93  
2004 7 100 96 94  19 100 97 93  5 100 96 92  
2005 21 100 100 99  16 100 100 98  15 100 98 96  
2006 24 100 97 95  20 100 95 88  8 100 97 94  
2007 31 100 97 93  29 100 95 90  17 100 97 88  
2008 9 100 93 89  5 100 93 82  13 100 66 66  
2009 23 100 100 N/A  20 100 100 N/A  15 100 89 N/A  
2010 9 100 100 N/A  8 100 92 N/A  7 100 95 N/A  
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Table IV: AFT results (M&A are failures) 
This table shows the results of the AFT model (with M&A delistings regarded as failures) using alternate measures of cornerstone and strategic investors: Strategic/Cornerstone 
investors is measured as a binary variable in Model I, as their average lock-up periods in Model II, as the number of investors in Model III, as the ratio of foreign cornerstone 
investors to local ones in Model IV and as the proportion of shares allocated in Model V. Demand multiple is the oversubscription rate for shares at the time of the IPO. Insider 
ownership is the percentage of insider ownership at the time of the IPO. Family control is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the IPO firm is family controlled and zero 
otherwise. Instit. Allocation is the proportion of shares in the IPO allocated to institutional investors. Age is the number of years from establishment until the IPO. Size is the 
logarithm of logarithm of the market capitalization at the offer price. Initial return is the difference between the first-day closing and offer price as a percentage of the offer price. 
Proceeds is IPO proceeds in million Hong Kong dollars. Pre-IPO net profits is the operating income in the year before the year of the IPO. Pre-IPO sales is sales before the year 
of the IPO. H-share is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the IPO firm is incorporated in mainland China but listed in Hong Kong and zero otherwise. Reputable underwriter is a 
dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an IPO is underwritten by reputable underwriters as measured by the number of IPOs and proceeds, and zero otherwise. We control for year 
and industry in the regressions. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
M&As as failures 
 
Model I 
Binary 
Model II 
Lock-up 
Model III 
Number 
Model IV 
Foreign-local 
Model V 
Allocations 
 
Model VI 
Binary 
Model VII 
Lock-up 
  Coeff TR Coeff TR Coeff TR Coeff TR Coeff TR Coeff TR Coeff TR 
               
Strategic investor 0.382*** 1.466 0.275*** 1.316 0.401*** 1.494 0.548*** 1.730 0.311* 1.365 0.248** 1.282 0.220** 1.245 
Strategic investor x Reput underwriter           0.348*** 1.416 0.561*** 1.752 
Cornerstone investor 0.196 1.216 0.049 1.050 0.067 1.069 0.115 1.122 0.193 1.213 0.054 1.055 0.141 1.151 
Cornerstone investor x Reput underwriter           0.094* 1.099 0.065* 1.067 
Demand multiple  0.090* 1.094 0.085** 1.088 0.088** 1.092 0.033** 1.034 0.032* 1.033 0.071 1.074 0.061 1.063 
Insider ownership 0.257** 1.293 0.153** 1.165 0.147** 1.159 0.165** 1.180 0.166*** 1.180 0.215** 1.240 0.154** 1.167 
Family control 0.241* 1.273 0.327** 1.386 0.376** 1.457 0.269** 1.309 0.260** 1.297 0.287* 1.333 0.337* 1.401 
Instit. allocation  0.484* 1.623 0.296** 1.344 0.479** 1.615 0.263** 1.301 0.264** 1.303 0.373* 1.452 0.327* 1.387 
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Table IV continues 
 
Age 0.136* 1.145 0.075 1.078 0.072 1.074 0.031 1.031 0.025 1.025 0.119* 1.126 0.051 1.053 
Size 0.063*** 1.065 0.035*** 1.036 0.034*** 1.034 0.037*** 1.038 0.037*** 1.038 0.089** 1.093 0.056** 1.058 
Initial return 0.394** 1.551 0.013 1.013 0.024 1.025 0.012 1.012 0.012 1.012 0.176* 1.193 0.018 1.018 
Proceeds 0.064** 1.066 0.038*** 1.038 0.036*** 1.037 0.040*** 1.038 0.038*** 1.038 0.067** 1.069 0.038** 1.039 
Pre-IPO net profits 0.084* 1.088 0.041 1.042 0.012* 1.012 0.031* 1.032 0.034* 1.035 0.064 1.066 0.043 1.044 
Pre-IPO sales 0.102* 1.107 0.010 1.010 0.015 1.015 0.009 1.009 0.015 1.009 0.076 1.079 0.070 1.073 
H-shares 0.089 1.093 0.042 1.043 0.074 1.076 0.024 1.024 0.026 1.027 0.080 1.084 0.049 1.051 
Reput underwriter 0.141** 1.152 0.019 1.019 0.017 1.017 0.045 1.046 0.050* 1.051 0.137** 1.146 0.073* 1.075 
Industry Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Year  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Constant -0.721  1.127  1.304  1.512  1.387  -0.641  0.511  
               
Pseudo R-square 0.171  0.182  0.181  0.180  0.184  0.151  0.140  
No of obs. 903  903  903  903  903  903  903  
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Table V: AFT results (M&A are censored survivors) 
This table shows the results of an AFT model (where M&A delistings are treated as censored survivors) using alternate measures 
of cornerstone and strategic investors: Strategic/Cornerstone investors is measured as a binary variable in Model I, as their 
average lock-up periods in Model II, as the number of investors in Model III, as the ratio of foreign cornerstone investors to local 
ones in Model IV and as the proportion of shares allocated in Model V. Demand multiple is the oversubscription rate for shares at 
the time of the IPO. Insider ownership is the percentage of insider ownership at the time of the IPO. Family control is a dummy 
variable taking a value of one if the IPO firm is family controlled and zero otherwise. Instit. Allocation is the proportion of shares 
in the IPO allocated to institutional investors. Age is the number of years from establishment until the IPO. Size is the logarithm 
of logarithm of the market capitalization at the offer price. Initial return is the difference between the first-day closing and offer 
price as a percentage of the offer price. Proceeds is IPO proceeds in million Hong Kong dollars. Pre-IPO net profits is the 
operating income in the year before the year of the IPO. Pre-IPO sales is sales before the year of the IPO. H-share is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the IPO firm is incorporated in mainland China but listed in Hong Kong and zero otherwise. Reputable 
underwriter is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an IPO is underwritten by reputable underwriters as measured by the 
number of IPOs and proceeds, and zero otherwise. We control for year and industry in the regressions. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
(M&As treated as censored) 
Model I 
Binary 
Model II 
Lock-up 
Model III 
Number 
Model IV 
Foreign-local 
Model V 
Allocations 
  Coeff TR Coeff TR Coeff TR Coeff TR Coeff TR 
           
Strategic investor 0.325*** 1.385 0.280*** 1.324 0.320*** 1.377 1.257*** 3.516 0.114 1.121 
Cornerstone investor 0.189 1.209 0.016 1.016 0.016 1.016 0.106 1.112 0.037 1.038 
Demand multiple  0.047** 1.048 0.082 1.085 0.075 1.077 0.080 1.084 0.080 1.084 
Insider ownership 0.230*** 1.258 0.213*** 1.238 0.213*** 1.237 0.212** 1.237 0.234*** 1.264 
Family control 0.027 1.027 0.188 1.207 0.109 1.115 0.165 1.179 0.131 1.140 
Instit. allocation  0.189* 1.208 0.011 1.011 0.122 1.130 0.123 1.131 0.028 1.028 
Age 0.104 1.110 0.019 1.019 0.019 1.019 0.019 1.019 0.023 1.024 
Size 0.061*** 1.063 0.048*** 1.049 0.049*** 1.049 0.048*** 1.049 0.048*** 1.048 
Initial return 0.116 1.123 0.020 1.020 0.029 1.030 0.013 1.013 0.015 1.015 
Proceeds 0.063** 1.065 0.051*** 1.053 0.051*** 1.053 0.051*** 1.053 0.051*** 1.053 
Pre-IPO net profits 0.060 1.061 0.017 1.018 0.010 1.010 0.019 1.019 0.003 1.003 
Pre-IPO sales 0.064 1.067 0.015 1.015 0.016 1.016 0.015 1.015 0.019 1.020 
H-shares 0.173 1.189 0.174 1.191 0.150 1.162 0.182 1.199 0.195 1.215 
Reput underwriter 0.102* 1.108 0.070 1.072 0.118 1.125 0.068 1.070 0.231 1.260 
Industry Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Year  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Constant -1.872  1.408  1.420  1.414  1.417  
           
Pseudo R-square 0.188  0.186  0.188  0.182  0.179  
No of obs 903  903  903  903  903  
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Table VI: Cox model 
This table shows the results of a Cox model in which M&A delistings are regarded as failures (Model I) and 
censored survivors (Model II): Strategic investors is a dummy equal to 1 if strategic investors invested in the 
company and zero otherwise. Cornerstone investors is a dummy equal to 1 if cornerstone investors invested in 
the company and zero otherwise. Demand multiple is the oversubscription rate for shares at the time of the IPO. 
Insider ownership is the percentage of insider ownership at the time of the IPO. Family control is a dummy 
variable taking a value of one if the IPO firm is family controlled and zero otherwise. Instit. Allocation is the 
proportion of shares in the IPO allocated to institutional investors. Age is the number of years from establishment 
until the IPO. Size is the logarithm of logarithm of the market capitalization at the offer price. Initial return is the 
difference between the first-day closing and offer price as a percentage of the offer price. Proceeds is IPO 
proceeds in million Hong Kong dollars. Pre-IPO net profits is the operating income in the year before the year of 
the IPO. Pre-IPO sales is sales before the year of the IPO. H-share is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the IPO 
firm is incorporated in mainland China but listed in Hong Kong and zero otherwise. Reputable underwriter is a 
dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an IPO is underwritten by reputable underwriters as measured by the 
number of IPOs and proceeds, and zero otherwise. We control for year and industry in the regressions. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Variables Model I : M&A as failure Model II: M&A as censored 
  Coeff Haz-ratio Coeff Haz-ratio 
     
Strategic investor -0.435*** 0.647 -0.987** 0.373 
Cornerstone investor -0.231 0.729 -0.151 0.860 
Demand multiple  -0.015* 0.985 -0.149* 0.861 
Insider ownership -0.364** 0.695 -0.373*** 0.688 
Family control -0.136 0.873 -0.219 0.804 
Instit. allocation  -0.102 0.903 -0.315 0.730 
Age -0.048 0.953 -0.172 0.842 
Size -0.161* 0.852 -0.186*** 0.830 
Initial return -0.144* 0.866 -0.197* 0.821 
Proceeds -0.162** 0.850 -0.192*** 0.826 
Pre-IPO net profits -0.030 0.970 -0.085* 0.918 
Pre-IPO sales -0.012 0.988 -0.091 0.913 
H-shares -0.082 0.921 -0.163 0.849 
Reput underwriter -0.259** 0.772 -0.175 0.840 
Industry Y  Y  
Year  Y  Y  
     
     
Pseudo R-square 0.129  0.136  
No of obs 903   903   
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Table VII: Propensity score matching and selection  
This table shows the results of propensity score matching. Panel A shows the univariate analysis of the IPOs 
backed by cornerstone investors and the matched sample. Panel B shows the results for the strategic investors 
and the matched sample. Panel C shows the multivariate analysis using the AFT model. Model I shows the 
results when M&As are treated as failures, while Model II shows the results when M&As are censored.  Model 
III shows the results of sample selection. Strategic investors is a dummy equal to 1 if strategic investors invested 
in the company and zero otherwise. Cornerstone investors is a dummy equal to 1 if cornerstone investors 
invested in the company and zero otherwise. Demand multiple is the oversubscription rate for shares at the time 
of the IPO. Insider ownership is the percentage of insider ownership at the time of the IPO. Family control is a 
dummy variable taking a value of one if the IPO firm is family controlled and zero otherwise. Instit. Allocation is 
the proportion of shares in the IPO allocated to institutional investors. Age is the number of years from 
establishment until the IPO. Size is the logarithm of logarithm of the market capitalization at the offer price. 
Initial return is the difference between the first-day closing and offer price as a percentage of the offer price. 
Proceeds is IPO proceeds in million Hong Kong dollars. Pre-IPO net profits is the operating income in the year 
before the year of the IPO. Pre-IPO sales is sales before the year of the IPO. H-share is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the IPO firm is incorporated in mainland China but listed in Hong Kong and zero otherwise. 
Reputable underwriter is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an IPO is underwritten by reputable 
underwriters as measured by the number of IPOs and proceeds, and zero otherwise. We control for year and 
industry. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Panel A:  Univariate Cornerstone  Matched sample 
 Mean Median  Mean Median 
Age 15.9 12.65  15.26 12.14 
Initial return 0.18 0.11  0.17 0.10 
Size (m) 6220 4150  6157 4050 
Proceeds (m) 2140 1180  2011 1109 
Pre-IPO sales (m)  5056 4328  4954 4241 
Pre-IPO net profits 393 248  381 240 
No of obs. 179   110  
      
Panel B:  Univariate Strategic  Matched sample 
 Mean Median  Mean Median 
Age 20.1 16  18.89 15.04 
Initial return 0.10 0.06  0.11 0.07 
Size (m) 4789 3730  4597 3676 
Proceeds (m) 1968 1085  1949 1074 
Pre-IPO sales (m)  4940 4228  4841 4144 
Pre-IPO net profits 388 245  376 237 
No of obs. 202   127  
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Table VII continued 
Panel C 
AFT Analysis 
 based on matched sample 
Model I (M&A as Failures) Model II (M&A as Censored Survival) Model III (M&A as Failures) 
Coefficient Time-ratio Coefficient Time-ratio Coefficient Time-ratio 
       
Strategic investor 0.544*** 1.723 0.374** 1.454 0.1446** 1.1556 
Cornerstone investor 0.097 1.102 0.184 1.202 0.1679 1.1828 
Inverse mills (Strategic)     -0.1116 0.8944 
Inverse mills (Cornerstone)     0.1829 1.2922 
Demand multiple  0.169** 1.184 0.048* 1.049 0.0599 1.0617 
Insider ownership 0.220** 1.246 0.346** 1.413 0.2300* 1.2586 
Family control 0.050 1.052 0.038 1.039 0.1550 1.1676 
Instit. allocation  0.283** 1.327 0.305** 1.357 0.2529 1.2877 
Age 0.033 1.034 0.124 1.132 0.0116 1.0117 
Size 0.064** 1.066 0.083** 1.087 0.0627* 1.0647 
Initial return 0.141 1.151 0.139 1.149 0.2532 1.2882 
Proceeds 0.066** 1.068 0.089** 1.093 0.0263* 1.0267 
Pre-IPO net profits 0.028 1.028 0.075* 1.078 0.1234 1.1313 
Pre-IPO sales 0.024 1.025 0.104* 1.110 0.0084 1.0084 
H-shares 0.103 1.108 0.144 1.155 0.1925 1.2122 
Reputable underwriter 0.059 1.061 0.062 1.064 0.0234 1.0236 
Industry Y  Y  Y  
Year  Y  Y  Y  
Constant -0.451  -0.534  -0.2245  
       
Pseudo R-square 0.12  0.11  0.085  
No of obs. 618  618  381  
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Appendix Table I: Definition of Variables 
Variable Definition of variable and unit of measurement Data source  
Strategic investors/ 
Cornerstone investors 
The involvement and commitment of strategic investors, and 
separately of cornerstone investors, are measured by five 
alternate indicators: (i) a binary indicator (coded one if the 
given investor type is involved in an IPO and zero otherwise); 
(ii) the average lock-up period of these investors in an IPO; (iii)  
the numbers of these investors involved in an IPO; (Iv) the ratio 
of foreign to locally-based  investors and (v) the proportion of 
shares in an IPO allocated to these investors.  
IPO prospectus (cross-
referenced with 
allotment/allocation data 
from Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange) 
 
Institutional 
allocations 
Proportion of shares allocated to institutional investors at the 
time of an IPO. 
Allotment/allocation data 
from Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange 
Demand multiple  Oversubscription for shares at the time of the IPO. It is 
calculated as the total number of shares applied for, deflated by 
the total number of shares offered. 
Allotment/allocation data 
from Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange 
Insider ownership  Percentage of insider ownership at the time of IPO completion. IPO prospectus 
Size Market capitalization at IPO: number of shares outstanding at 
IPO times initial offer price measured in HK$ millions. 
IPO prospectus 
Age Number of years between incorporation and IPO date. IPO prospectus 
Initial return First-day closing price minus offer price divided by offer price; 
as a percentage. 
IPO prospectus. 
Proceeds Money raised at the IPO; issue proceeds.  IPO prospectus 
Pre-IPO sales  Sales in the year prior to and the year of the IPO: years -1 to 0. IPO prospectus 
Pre-IPO net profits Operating income in the year prior to and the year of the IPO: 
years -1 to 0. 
IPO prospectus 
Family A binary variable equal to 1 if the IPO is family controlled, and 
zero otherwise. 
IPO prospectus 
H Share A binary variable equal to 1 if the IPO is incorporated in China, 
and zero otherwise. 
IPO prospectus 
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Appendix Table I continued 
Reputable underwriter A binary variable taking a value of 1 if an IPO is underwritten 
by top underwriters and zero otherwise. Top underwriters are 
those in the top quartile in terms of both numbers and proceeds 
of IPOs they bring to the market during 3 years prior to the IPO 
year.  
Hong Kong Stock Market 
Industry  Industry dummies based on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
industry classification, indicating companies in the following 
categories: 
 financial industry 
 cyclical services 
 information technology 
 non-cyclical consumer goods 
 resources 
The industry class “Others” is used as the base category in the 
estimations. 
Hong Kong Stock Market 
Annual Fact Book. 
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Appendix Table II: Descriptive statistics for the full sample 1997-2010 
Instit. allocation is the proportion of shares in the IPO allocated to institutional shareholders. Demand multiple 
is the oversubscription rate for shares at the time of the IPO. Insider ownership is the percentage of insider 
ownership at the time of the IPO. Family control is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the IPO firm is 
family controlled and zero otherwise. Age is the number of years from establishment until the IPO. Initial 
return is the difference between the first-day closing and offer prices as a percentage of the offer price. Size is 
market capitalization at the IPO price (in million Hong Kong dollars). Proceeds is IPO proceeds in million 
Hong Kong dollars. Pre-IPO sales is sales before the year of the IPO. Pre-IPO net profits is the operating 
income in the year before the year of the IPO. H-share is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the IPO firm is 
incorporated in  mainland China but listed in Hong Kong and zero otherwise. Reputable underwriter is a 
dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an IPO is underwritten by reputable underwriters as measured by the 
number of IPOs and proceeds, and zero otherwise.  
Full sample Mean Median STD Min Max 
            
Instit. allocation 0.560 0.720 0.401 0.000 0.920 
Demand multiple 84.420 21.330 164.220 0.760 789.290 
Insider ownership 0.711 0.701 0.054 0.520 0.870 
Family control (binary) 0.411 0.000 0.492 0.000 1.000 
Age 17.000 13.000 12.110 4.800 58.000 
Initial return 0.130 0.070 0.220 -0.110 0.880 
Size (m) 5310.23 3472.85 6963.34 181 26100 
Proceeds (m) 2247.62 1419.63 2304.21 50 6520 
Pre-IPO sales (m) 4904.35 4222.63 3100.15 94.78 9238.00 
Pre-IPO net profits (m) 441.77 271.67 122.41 19.78 1127.66 
H-Share dummy 0.142 0.000 0.340 0.000 1.000 
Reputable underwriter 0.149 0.000 0.411 0.000 1.000 
No of obs 607         
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Appendix Table III: Descriptive statistics for IPOs without strategic or cornerstone investors 1997-2010 
Instit. allocation is the proportion of shares in the IPO allocated to institutional shareholders. Demand multiple is 
the oversubscription rate for shares at the time of the IPO. Insider ownership is the percentage of insider 
ownership at the time of the IPO. Family control is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the IPO firm is 
family controlled and zero otherwise. Age is the number of years from establishment until the IPO. Initial return 
is the difference between the first-day closing and offer prices as a percentage of the offer price. Size is market 
capitalization at the IPO price (in million Hong Kong dollars). Proceeds is IPO proceeds in million Hong Kong 
dollars. Pre-IPO sales is sales before the year of the IPO. Pre-IPO net profits is the operating income in the year 
before the year of the IPO. H-share is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the IPO firm is incorporated in mainland 
China but listed in Hong Kong and zero otherwise. Reputable underwriter is a dummy variable taking a value of 
1 if an IPO is underwritten by reputable underwriters as measured by the number of IPOs and proceeds, and zero 
otherwise.  
IPOs without strategic or cornerstone 
investors (1997-2010)  
Mean Median STD Min Max 
          
Instit. allocation 0.41 1.03 0.58 0.00 0.82 
Demand multiple 57.03 6.50 207.51 0.76 789.29 
Insider ownership 0.60 0.57 0.04 0.52 0.79 
Family control (binary) 0.56 0.00 0.75 0.00 1.00 
Age 13.47 9.53 9.31 4.8 43.64 
Initial return 0.10 0.03 0.25 -0.20 0.88 
Size (m) 4642.61 2203.64 5429.23 181 20114.15 
Proceeds (m) 2331.07 1659.19 2568.79 50 5762.62 
Pre-IPO sales (m) 4521.77 3810.96 3199.97 829.24 8323.69 
Pre-IPO net profits (m) 516.72 358.15 289.65 268.80 1127.66 
H-Share dummy 0.09 0.00 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Reputable underwriter 0.08 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
No of obs 226         
 
 
39 
 
Appendix Table IV: AFT results (M&A are failures) (1997-2010) 
This table shows the results of the AFT model (with M&A delistings regarded as failures) using alternate measures of 
cornerstone and strategic investors: Strategic/Cornerstone investors is measured as a binary variable in Model I, as 
their average lock-up periods in Model II, as the number of investors in Model III, as the ratio of foreign cornerstone 
investors to local ones in Model IV and as the proportion of shares allocated in Model V. Demand multiple is the 
oversubscription rate for shares at the time of the IPO. Insider ownership is the percentage of insider ownership at the 
time of the IPO. Family control is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the IPO firm is family controlled and zero 
otherwise. Instit. Allocation is the proportion of shares in the IPO allocated to institutional investors. Age is the 
number of years from establishment until the IPO. Size is the logarithm of logarithm of the market capitalization at the 
offer price. Initial return is the difference between the first-day closing and offer price as a percentage of the offer 
price. Proceeds is IPO proceeds in million Hong Kong dollars. Pre-IPO net profits is the operating income in the year 
before the year of the IPO. Pre-IPO sales is sales before the year of the IPO. H-share is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if the IPO firm is incorporated in mainland China but listed in Hong Kong and zero otherwise. Reputable 
underwriter is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an IPO is underwritten by reputable underwriters as measured 
by the number of IPOs and proceeds, and zero otherwise. We control for year and industry in the regressions. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
M&As as failures 
 
Model I 
Binary 
Model II 
Lock-up 
Model III 
Number 
Model IV 
Foreign-local 
Model V 
Allocations 
  Coeff TR Coeff TR Coeff TR Coeff TR Coeff TR 
           
Strategic investor 0.284*** 1.328 0.298*** 1.347 0.400*** 1.491 0.537*** 1.710 0.242* 1.274 
Cornerstone 
investor 0.159 1.172 0.062 1.064 0.053 1.054 0.148 1.159 0.172 1.188 
Demand multiple  0.086 1.090 0.161** 1.174 0.154** 1.167 0.164** 1.178 0.150** 1.162 
Insider ownership 0.187* 1.205 0.069* 1.071 0.066* 1.068 0.052* 1.053 0.062* 1.064 
Family control 0.232* 1.261 0.436** 1.547 0.422** 1.526 0.212** 1.236 0.219** 1.245 
Instit. allocation  0.300 1.350 0.215** 1.240 0.220** 1.246 0.233 1.262 0.216** 1.241 
Age 0.087* 1.091 0.032 1.033 0.038 1.039 0.014 1.014 0.012 1.012 
Size 0.091** 1.096 0.034** 1.035 0.032** 1.032 0.030** 1.030 0.030** 1.031 
Initial return 0.200* 1.222 0.187 1.206 0.093 1.097 0.034 1.034 0.047 1.048 
Proceeds 0.085** 1.088 0.034** 1.035 0.032** 1.032 0.030** 1.031 0.031** 1.031 
Pre-IPO net profits 0.032 1.032 0.042 1.043 0.044 1.045 0.047 1.048 0.045 1.046 
Pre-IPO sales 0.038 1.038 0.068 1.071 0.050 1.052 0.047 1.048 0.014 1.014 
H-shares 0.098 1.103 0.0269 1.026 0.026 1.027 0.015 1.015 0.017 1.017 
Reput underwriter 0.109** 1.116 0.021 1.021 0.014 1.014 0.085 1.089 0.091* 1.095 
Industry Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Year  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Constant -0.611  0.877  0.881  1.512  1.387  
           
Pseudo R-square 0.122  0.151  0.147  0.161  0.171  
No of obs. 607  607  607  607  607  
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Appendix Table V: Correlation matrix 
 
Variables   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
              
Demand for 
subscription  (1) 1           
 
Insider ownership (2) -0.0855 1           
Family control (3) -0.0064 0.0122 1          
Instit. allocation  (4) -0.1071 0.0156 0.0143 1         
Age (5) 0.0338 -0.0137 -0.0683 -0.0759 1        
Initial return (6) 0.4102 -0.0309 0.011 -0.1949 0.0647 1       
Size (7) -0.0442 0.2031 -0.0156 0.2105 0.0319 -0.0525 1      
Proceeds (8) -0.0335 0.0996 -0.0095 0.24 0.0125 -0.0494 0.4484 1     
Pre-IPO net profits (9) -0.0269 0.1467 -0.1069 0.0827 0.0275 -0.0174 0.1867 0.1205 1    
Pre-IPO sales (10) -0.0413 0.0802 -0.1135 0.1052 0.0425 -0.0416 0.2094 0.054 0.4138 1   
H-shares (11) 0.0397 -0.0566 -0.0288 0.0649 -0.0191 0.0342 0.0991 0.0589 0.0041 0.0304 1  
Reputable underwriter (12) 0.096 -0.0363 -0.1367 -0.2038 0.0027 0.1088 -0.0249 -0.0121 -0.0484 -0.0396 -0.0343 1 
 
